What is a good incentive-compatible policy when one wants to respect individual choices of labor and human capital but eliminate inequalities due to unequal access to human capital and di¤erent returns to human capital, and when earnings and human capital expenditures are the only veri…able variables? We propose a social ordering that incorporates this goal and we analyze the evaluation of tax reforms and the properties of optimal linear and non-linear taxes. For reform evaluation and for optimal non-linear taxation, the focus is on the situation of individuals with the most disadvantaged characteristics who work full time and spend a certain (high) amount in human capital.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Mirrlees [29] most of the literature on income taxation has typically assumed that agents use a linear technology: their productive skills are …xed and independent of any factor that is subject to their choices. In spite of the numerous insights that this model has provided it su¤ers from two serious weaknesses. First, it is not very realistic. One can think for example of human capital. Agents can, at least to some extent, a¤ect their productivity by making certain choices about their level of human capital. So, at least intuitively, a system of human capital subsidies can be used as a mean for redistributing income across agents and help to better tackle the trade o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity. Second, the fact that productivity Princeton University, USA. Email: m ‡eurba@princeton.edu. y Dep. of Economics, University of Maastricht. Email: g.valletta@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
is exogenous partially hinders the possibility of examining the consequences of certain normative considerations. Assume one wants to compensate agents for their lack of productivity as long as they are not responsible for it. A model where productivity is exogenous would not allow to distinguish between a low-skilled agent who has responsibly chosen her lower productivity and another low-skilled agent who has instead su¤ered from various impediments which have prevented her from acquiring a higher skill.
We propose a model where agents di¤er in three characteristics. First, agents di¤er in their human capital-dependent earning ability. Typically human capital positively a¤ects productivity, and a higher (marginal) productivity is typically re ‡ected by an increased wage. 1 However the impact of human capital on earning ability can vary across agents. In particular, an individual might be more productive than another one for any possible level of human capital and such heterogeneity might be due to innate factors, or social connections, which are beyond their responsibility.
Second, in order to reach a certain level of human capital, di¤erent agents might have to face di¤erent intrinsic costs. That is, agents have a di¤erent human capital disposition. For instance, one could think of health. Two agents might both be willing to be in good health but one of them su¤ers from a congenital disease and only an expansive treatment allows her to be in good health:
she has a worst human capital disposition than the other one. Once again these di¤erences are typically due to factors that are beyond agents'responsibility: agents may have a di¤erent human capital disposition because of genetic factors 2 , their upbringing or the social context they live in. 3 We will refer to these two characteristics, the earning ability and the human capital disposition, as to the circumstances of a certain agent.
Third, agents have heterogeneous preferences over consumption, labour and human capital:
they typically make di¤erent choices about their consumption, about their labor time, and about their human capital level.
In such a framework we study criteria to evaluate policies aiming at combining income tax with a system of subsidies on human capital expenditure. More precisely, a tax policy is a function 1 This is certainly the case for health care as shown, among others, by Mushkin [30] , Grossman and Benham [20] , Luft [26] . 2 Christensen et al. [9] shows that approximately a quarter of the variation in the liability to self-reported health and the number of hospitalizations could be attributed to genetic factors. 3 A high socio-economic status is typically associated with better health and longer life, see for example Reid et al. [32] , or Marmot el al. [28] .
de…ning a transfer of income depending both on the level of earnings and on the human capital expenditure. So two agents with the same earnings might be subject to a di¤erent taxation (for example, one is subsidized and the other is taxed) solely because of a di¤erent human capital expenditure.
To perform our analysis we use social preferences that incorporate e¢ ciency and fairness concerns. As also recently stressed by Piketty and Saez [31] , the classical utilitarian social welfare function would not allow us to incorporate the value judgment that inequalities due to circumstances are more o¤ensive than inequalities due to di¤erences in preferences. Boadway et al. [4] introduced weights in the social welfare function in order to accommodate this idea, but did not provide a precise methodology to determine suitable weights. Such a methodology has been developed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 4 and we borrow it here. Speci…cally, we derive a social welfare ordering which is based on a particular welfare representation of agents'preferences. An individual's well-being is measured by the amount of money that would leave her indi¤erent between her current situation and being free to choose her labor time and her human capital expenditure from a hypothetical budget set where both her earning ability and her human capital disposition are equal to the average ones. Such a measure of individual well-being does not require any other information about individuals'utilities than their ordinal non-comparable preferences, a convenient property that follows from the attribution of responsibility for preferences and subjective utility to the individuals themselves. The well-being levels of agents, at any allocation, are then aggregated using the leximin criterion.
In spite of the complexity of the model we are able to provide a criterion for the comparison of non-linear tax policies in a setting where only earned income and human capital expenditure are observable. This task is made possible by the fact that we are using social preferences of the leximin type. Indeed, in order to understand which part of the tax function should be changed in priority, in case of reform, one needs to spot the worst o¤ agent at the allocation generated by the tax function under examination. It turns out that the focus should always be on a speci…c region of the budget set shaped by the tax function. In order to evaluate a certain tax scheme the policy maker should look primarily at the part of the budget set that is attainable by an agent with the worst earning ability and the worst human capital disposition. However the worst o¤ agent at the allocation generated by a certain tax policy does not actually need to be an agent 4 Fleurbaey (2008), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011a,b) .
whose circumstances are the worst in society. Nonetheless, giving priority to the region of the budget set that is attainable by poor agents means that the main concern of the policy maker should not necessarily be to improve the condition of agents with a low level of human capital but rather look, more in general, at agents for whom acquiring human capital is particularly di¢ cult (i.e., agents with a bad human capital disposition). We also study the shape of the optimal income schedule. We consider …rst the case of linear taxes. It turns out that in certain instances taxing human capital expenditure might be optimal. Interestingly the occurrence of a negative subsidy rate on human capital expenditure is closely related to the distribution of preferences across the population. For example an high sensitivity of human capital expenditures to subsidies together with a low sensitivity of earnings to tax will bring high tax rates and low subsidy rates. The same happens if the worst o¤ agent spends considerably less than average in human capital or if she earns considerably more than average. On the other hand, when we turn our attention to the nonlinear case we …nd that the agents who are at the focus of social preferences are typically subsidized. As a matter of fact the agent who receives the highest subsidy is some unskilled agent who works full time and who, among all the agents with the poorest health disposition, has the highest human capital expenditure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model and the notation. Section 4 introduces the notion of social preferences used in the paper and the ethical requirements they bear. Section 5 proposes a way to compare di¤erent arbitrary tax policies. Section 6 describes some features of the optimal linear tax schedule. Section 7 describes some features of the optimal non-linear tax schedule. Section 8 deals with the case of observable human capital. Section 9 concludes. The appendix brie ‡y resumes the axiomatic analysis.
Related literature
The generality of our model allows to build several links with di¤erent strands of the literature on optimal income taxation depending on how one interprets human capital.
One can think of human capital as the level of education of agents. There are few papers about the subsidization of education that allow for endogenous productivities (see among others, Jacobsyand and Lans [25] Bovenbergz, Guo and Krause [22] , Maldonado [27] ). The underlying idea is that education should be either taxed or subsidized depending on whether the elasticity of earnings with respect to education is positively in ‡uenced by the labor supply or by the earning ability. 5 Our results also suggest that human capital expenditure might be taxed however both the scope and the rationale of our …ndings di¤er from those just mentioned. First, we …nd that taxing human capital might be optimal in the particular case of linear taxes. Second, whether or not taxing human capital is optimal depends not only on the technology available to agents (marginal bene…t vs. marginal cost of human capital) but, as mentioned earlier, it also quite relevantly depends on the distribution of preferences across the population. This feature is speci…c to our setting, indeed in the papers mentioned above agents have (homogeneous) preferences over consumption and labor
and are indi¤erent about education (which is merely instrumental in increasing productivity).
One can also interpret human capital as the level of health of the individuals. Interestingly most of the literature focusing on the taxation/subsidization of health care does not allow for endogenous earning abilities. Health is rather considered as a factor that can randomly a¤ect the amount of resources available to an individual (see, among others, Blomqvist and Horn [2] , Cremer and Pestieau [8] , Rochet [33] and Henriet and Rochet [23] ). The main objective of these papers is to understand whether covering people against such a risk, by means of a public health insurance, is welfare improving or not from an ex ante perspective.
All the papers quoted so far have focused on social objectives de…ned in terms of utilitariantype social welfare functions. Such social welfare functions are typically not precisely speci…ed, and the objective of redistributing resources only depends on their degree of concavity. Moreover they rely on speci…c assumptions about preferences such as separability, and generally assume that all individuals have the same utility function. A common result of this approach is that marginal tax rates are everywhere positive. Interestingly, this result still holds in situations where the maximin criterion is used. Boadway and Jacquet [3] provide minimal conditions for the marginal tax rate to be not only positive but also decreasing throughout the whole skill distribution.
Things become considerably more complex if individual preferences are assumed to be heterogeneous. As a matter of fact papers that deal with this assumption exclusively focus on income taxation, and human capital is not part of the analysis. Agents'productivities are heterogeneous but exogenous (see, among others, Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau and Racionero [4] , Choné and
Laroque [6] [7], Jacquet and Van de gaer [24] , Saez [35] ). As noted in the introduction, a key 5 If for example the elasticity of earnings with respect to education depends more strongly on labor supply than on ability then it is optimal to subsidize education for the sake of e¢ ciency.
di¢ culty that comes with preference heterogeneity is that in order to sum the utility levels of agents endowed with di¤erent preferences one needs a cardinalization of utilities. Moreover, as pointed by Jacquet and Van de gaer [24] , with double heterogeneity traditional welfarist criteria (including utilitarianism) might lead to policy recommendations that are unappealing in at least two respects. First, they fail to compensate agents for inequalities deriving from characteristics they cannot be held responsible for. Second, depending on the weights assigned to di¤erent kinds of preferences the optimal policy might require to redistribute income even if all agents have the same earning ability and the same disposition to acquire human capital.
In order to tackle these di¢ culties we use a precise de…nition of social welfare for a population that is heterogeneous in three dimensions. Such a social objective is derived from fairness principles that capture the idea that inequalities due to circumstances are unfair whereas inequalities due to di¤erences in preferences and utilities are acceptable. 6 Such a methodology was introduced by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [18] and has been used for the evaluation of public policies in several frameworks already. 7 In particular this approach has given interesting insights about the evaluation of tax policies. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [15] , [16] propose an array of social preferences (over the allocation of consumption and labor) and an array of criteria for the welfare evaluation of tax policies but their analysis is limited by the assumption that labor productivity is exogenous so that agents cannot be considered, to any extent, responsible for it. 8 A common feature of the (optimal) tax policies they propose is that poor hardworking agents should be granted the greatest subsidy in the whole population. From the standpoint of our more complex model, imposing the same tax burden (or subsidy) to individuals with the same human capital but a di¤erent human capital expenditure might lead, de facto, to income inequalities that are particularly undesirable among low income earners.
Valletta [36] introduced a simpli…ed version of our model, in which health in ‡uences productivity, the choice of the health status is dichotomous, and there are only two types of earning abilities 6 A frequent criticism is that di¤erences in utilities may re ‡ect di¤erent capacities for enjoyment that should be compensated as well. But if individuals di¤er in such capacities this should be explicitly introduced in the model, as additional objects of preferences. We assume that our model fully describes the object of individual preferences, so that di¤erences in utilities cannot be due to inequalities in additional internal resources that the individuals care about. For a study of compensation for inequalities in internal resources, see Fleurbaey [13] . 7 A broad and detailed description of this methodology and its possible applications is provided by Fleurbaey and Maniquet . [17] 8 See, however, Fleurbaey [13] (p. 149-150) for a brief analysis of endogenous skills.
and health dispositions in the population. His paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a social ordering function that can be easily extended to our model, and we will retain it here.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on commodity taxation. In their seminal contribution Atkinson and Stiglitz [1] showed that within a population of individuals who di¤er only in their labor productivity, if preferences are separable between labor and consumption of other goods, then commodity taxation cannot increase welfare above the level obtained with an optimal income tax alone. Many studies have examined the robustness of this result (see Boadway and
Pestieau [5] for an overview). For the case of heterogeneous preferences and non-linear commodity taxation, Fleurbaey [12] , using an approach similar to ours, shows that poor hardworking agnets should be submitted to a uniform or null commodity tax. This result does not hold in our framework if applied to human capital expenditures. This is explained by the fact that human capital is here a special commodity which a¤ects the agents'productivity, and agents have to face unequal costs in order to acquire it.
The model
We consider a set of economies, each with a …nite set of agents N N. There are three goods:
consumption, labor and human capital. A bundle, for agent i 2 N , is a triple z i = (c i ; l i ; h i ), where c i is consumption, l i is labor, and h i is human capital. In particular, c i 2 R + will be interpreted here as the expenditure on ordinary consumption goods, excluding human capital expenditure. For each agent i 2 N , preferences are denoted R i and z
i is weakly preferred (resp. strictly preferred, indi¤erent) to bundle
denote the population pro…le of preferences. We restrict our attention to preferences which are continuous, strictly monotonic (increasing in c i and h i , decreasing in l i ) and convex. Let R = 9 A more general model, describing human capital as a multidimensional variable, would be certainly more realistic and most of the results, in principle, would still hold. However this would render the analysis quite cumbersome.
(R i ) i2N denote the pro…le of preferences of the whole population.
The marginal productivity of labour is assumed to be an increasing function of human capital, w i (h i ) with w(0) 0. It is measured in consumption units per full time labor, so that for any l i , w i (h i )l i is the agent's pre-tax income (earnings). Agents are endowed with di¤erent such functions.
For some i; j 2 N we say that agent i is more productive than agent j if i's productivity function dominates j's, that is, if w i (h) w j (h) for all h. Let w(:) = (w i (:)) i2N denote the pro…le of individual productivity functions for the whole population.
Finally, every individual i has a mapping m i (h i ) describing how much of human capital expenses must be made in order to bring her to a human capital level h i . We assume that this function satis…es m i (h) = 0 for h h i , and belongs to two possible classes. In the …rst class, m i is increasing over h i ; h i ; and is equal to +1 for h > h i : In the second class, it is increasing over h i ; h i ; tends to +1 for h ! h i , and is equal to +1 for h h i : It is possible to have h i = 0 and/or h i = 1.
We de…ne the inverse function m An economy is denoted e = (R; w(:); m(:)). We let the population N remain implicit in this description of an economy. Let D denote the set of economies complying with our assumptions.
The set of allocations to be ranked by a social ordering is Z(e) = X jN j . This set includes feasible and non-feasible allocations. An allocation is feasible if
In absence of redistribution, the budget set of each agent i 2 N is equal to the possible combinations of consumption, labor and human capital that are attainable for her, given her earning ability and her human capital disposition. In the …rst best context, one can use lump-sum transfers in order to redistribute income across agents. Then, agent i's …rst-best budget set is, letting t i denote the transfer:
It is important to notice that agents have preferences for human capital so that they may choose a certain level of human capital just because they care about it and not necessarily because this choice is instrumental to the attainment of a higher level of consumption (the higher the level of human capital, the higher the earning ability).
In order to compare allocations in terms of fairness and e¢ ciency we will use a speci…c measure of social welfare. We will de…ne a complete ordering over all the (feasible and not feasible)
allocations and this will be denoted by R for the weak preferences, with related strict preferences P and indi¤erence I. In other words, z 0 Rz means that the allocation z 0 is (socially) at least as good as z, z 0 P z means that it is strictly better, and z 0 Iz that they are equivalent. As the social ordering will depend on the pro…le of the population, we in fact need a social ordering function (SOF), i.e., a mapping from the set of economies to the set of complete orderings over allocations.
So, for each e 2 D, we write R(e), P (e), and I(e) in order to express the fact that particular social preferences are speci…c to the economy e 2 D.
From fairness requirements to social welfare
This section introduces the speci…c notion of social welfare we use in this paper. Before that let us introduce the two main fairness requirements that single out this speci…c way of ranking social alternatives.
The need for redistribution comes …rst of all from the idea that one would like to compensate agents for di¤erences in their circumstances that are beyond their responsibility. In our framework this amounts to saying that inequalities deriving solely from someone's human capital disposition or someone's earning ability are not acceptable. In other words:
It is a strict social improvement to change an allocation by modifying the consumption levels of two agents i and j who have identical preferences R i = R j , the same amount of labor time and the same level of human capital, from c i ,c j to c
where is some strictly positive real number.
If compared to previous contributions (Fleurbaey and Maniquet [15] [16]), our richer model allows us to re…ne the normative analysis about the way personal responsibility relates to unequal achievements. Indeed, one should notice that the main implication of this fairness requirement is that agents here are only partially responsible for (the level of) their marginal productivity because in part they can a¤ect it by changing their human capital level. For example, an agent with a low level of human capital is compensated for her lack of productivity as long as she is compared with another agent with the same level of human capital but with a better earning ability function.
On the other hand this fairness requirement is silent in those situations when a di¤erent marginal productivity is solely due to di¤erent choices made by di¤erent individuals (for example, an agent with a low level of human capital is not compensated for her lack of productivity if she is compared with an agent who has chosen to increase her marginal productivity by acquiring a higher level of human capital).
Redistribution should anyway have a limit: inequalities solely due to di¤erent choices might be acceptable since individuals should, at least to some extent, be held responsible for their goals. If all agents had the same human capital disposition mapping and the same earning ability mapping, then they should be let free to choose a di¤erent amount of labor, a di¤erent level of human capital and hence, indirectly, a di¤erent productivity.
It is a strict social improvement, in a society where all agents have the same circumstances, to change an allocation obtained via lump-sum transfers by modifying the lump-sum transfers of any two agents i and j, from t i ,t j to t
Notice that this requirement implies that the laissez-faire allocation (i.e., no redistribution)
should be the social optimum in this particular case of uniform earning ability and uniform human capital disposition.
The rest of the paper analyzes the consequences of such fairness requirements on the evaluation of policies. In order to do so we rely on a certain notion of social welfare that stems directly from the requirements we have just presented, together with e¢ ciency, informational and robustness requirements. The appendix provides the complete list of the axioms. These axioms single out both a speci…c measure of individual well-being (i.e., a way to perform interpersonal comparisons) and a way to aggregate these individual measures.
The index of well-being that is obtained is the lump sum transfer that would leave the agent indi¤erent between her current bundle and being free to choose her labor time and her human capital expenditure from a (hypothetical) budget set where both her earning ability and her human capital disposition are equal to the average ones. More formally, let w(:) = This expression, if considered as a function of z i , corresponds (for a given R i ) to a particular moneymetric utility function. This measure of individual well-being does not require any information about individuals'subjective utility, it depends only on ordinal non-comparable preferences.
For any given allocation we can compute the vector of implicit transfers associated with the bundles received by each agent. The level of social welfare is then measured by the lowest implicit transfer in society at such an allocation. Two di¤erent allocations will be ranked applying the leximin criterion to the vector of the corresponding implicit transfers.
Average Circumstances Egalitarian Equivalent Leximin SOF(ACEE).
For all e 2 D, z; z 0 2
Let us stress that that the particular reference budget set (the average one) used for the computation of the implicit transfer is, at least to some extent, dictated by the axioms we have used for the characterization. The axioms actually considerably constrain the set of potential options. The natural appeal of using average circumstances as a reference derives from the fact that, ideally, all agents are entitled to an equal split of the overall production possibility set.
We will use the notion of social welfare just described, …rst of all, as a tool for the evaluation of di¤erent arbitrary tax policies. As is well known in the taxation literature since Feldstein [10] , the reform problem is often more relevant to policy makers than knowing the features of the optimal tax policy. In such a case the policy maker is primarily interested in determining which part of the tax policy should be changed …rst in order to obtain a social improvement. 
Incentive-compatible allocations
Let B i (T ) denote this set. In what follows we will focus on the space of consumption, earnings, human capital expenditure where agent's i budget set becomes
so that the laissez-faire tax induces the budget set c = y m. In addition to the budget constraint, 
( 1) These are derived from the ordinary preferences R i de…ned in the (c; l; h)-space as follows:
These preferences are continuous, convex, increasing in c, non-decreasing in m, and decreasing in y. In addition, they satisfy the following restriction:
and m m 0 :
which is a direct consequence of monotonicity of preferences in l and h 11 .
The restriction described by (1) has important consequences on the agents' behavior. They will never choose a bundle (c; y; m) if they are given the possibility to choose another bundle which entails the same labor supply y=w (m), a greater m (therefore greater h), and no lower of money devoted to human capital is more than repaid by the fact the her productivity increases.
Hence, the increasing part of CD will never be chosen by the agent, whatever her preferences.
Finally, one should also notice that agent i might still choose a point on the decreasing part of CD: she could be willing, given her preferences, to give away consumption in order to acquire a 1 1 An additional restriction is that because this corresponds to a situation in which the corresponding (c; l; h) bundles are the same.
higher amount of human capital. 
In other words agent i has to receive an allocation that she prefers to the allocation received by agent j unless it is not possible for her to mimic agent j. This implies that any incentive- compatible. In other words, the taxation principle (Guesnerie [21] , Rochet [34] ) holds in this model.
An incentive compatible allocation so obtained is feasible if and only if
For every incentive-compatible allocation, there is a minimal tax that implements it, namely, the tax T such that y m T (y; m) follows the lower envelope of agents'upper contour sets in 
is increasing in x. No agent will choose such a point, whatever her preferences, because for a …xed
, consumption is increasing with human capital expenditure (one could think of the curve CD in the previous example).
Estimating social welfare
The evaluation of a policy clearly hinges on its social consequences. It turns out that evaluating the consequences of a certain policy is made tractable by the fact that we are using a social ordering function of the leximin type. Indeed, given the allocation generated by a given tax policy we just need to spot the worst o¤ agent at such an allocation. Once we have this piece of information we know which part of the budget set modi…ed by the tax function has to be changed (and how) in order to obtain a social improvement. Let T be an arbitrary tax function such that y m T (y; m) is non-decreasing in y and non-increasing in m. We want to compute min i IT (z i ; R i ) at the allocation z generated by T .
Let us …rst consider the budget set, modi…ed by the tax function T , of some agent i 2 N in (c; l; h) space. As explained above, the upper frontier of B i (T ) may contain dominated parts (in terms of consumption). Indeed, increasing h may entail an increase in productivity that pays more than its cost. It is therefore better to focus on the undominated parts of the budget set since this gives a more accurate picture of the well-being opportunities of the worst type. More precisely, let us de…ne a new budget set which ‡attens the dominated parts of the budget surface. For an arbitrary function f (h); let f + (h) be the lowest non-increasing cover of f , i.e., the lowest function that is non-increasing and never below f . For a given l and T , let
The new budget is de…ned as the set of (c; l; h) such that Moreover, for all i 2 N , the indi¤erence surface passing through z i lies always (weakly) above
, therefore (weakly) above B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)). Then, necessarily,
Upper bound: From the de…nition of IT (z i ; R i ) it follows that, for each i 2 N , at the allocation z,
The right-hand side of this inequality is, for i 2 N , equal to
Proposition 1 provides an imperfect way to compare di¤erent policies. First, it may be silent in some applications because it only brackets the value of min i IT (z i ; R i ). Second, the computation of the upper bound needs identifying the distribution of bundles of the individuals of all types. As the planner knows the distribution of characteristics in the population, this is a quantity that can be computed, i.e., it does not require identifying the characteristics of any particular individual.
Nonetheless it would be more convenient to obtain formulae that require even less information.
We study re…nements below.
Let us brie ‡y mention a favorable case that immediately follows from Proposition 1.
Corollary 2
If there is i 2 N such that
The literature on fair income tax in the Mirrlees model, as summarized in Fleurbaey and
Maniquet [17] , suggests focusing on the most disadvantaged individuals. It turns out that this does not work so well in our extended framework. Let us explain, by exploring how the results from this literature could be translated into our setting.
First, one can introduce the assumption that there is a worst type, in terms of circumstances, in the population pro…le, i.e., a poor agent that is uniformly disadvantaged with respect to earning ability and human capital disposition.
Assumption 1 (Worst Type): There is a nonempty subset P N and two functions w (:) ; m (:),
This assumption implies in particular that w (h) w (h) and m (h) m (h) and it simpli…es the analysis because it enables us to identify the worst o¤ agents more easily. Notice that, for every i 2 N ,
because the expression wl m T (wl; m) is non-decreasing in w and non-increasing in m. This means that the worst type has a budget set that is always included in the budget sets of all other types of agents. For i 2 P , the budget B 
T ).
Another assumption is needed to obtain that the lower bound expressed in Proposition 1 coincides with the well being level of the worst o¤ agent. It requires that whenever an individual is willing to choose a bundle that is accessible to the worst type, there is an agent of the worst type who is willing to choose the same bundle. This assumption is easier to satisfy with a large population (there must be as many sorts of preferences R i in P as there are in the rest of the population), but it may be satis…ed with a …nite number of agents. Note that it may impose restrictions on the agents'preferences, because their indi¤erence surfaces must not contain dominated areas for P agents, i.e., there must not exist x; x 0 such that xR i x 0 for some i 2 N and x 0 dominates x for any j 2 P (in the sense that i.e., x 0 dominates x for i as well. Therefore, in this case, Preference Diversity imposes no restriction on the preferences of agents from N n P .
The following result is similar to results obtained by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [15] , [16] .
Corollary 3 Assume Worst Type and Preference Diversity hold. Then for every minimal tax
T one has min i IT (z i ; R i ) = t 0 .
Proof. By Preference Diversity, the lower envelope of upper contour sets of all i 2 N , for bundles satisfying y w (m), coincides with the lower envelope of upper contour sets of all i 2 P . By construction, the lower envelope of upper contour sets for all i 2 P contains no dominated part.
Moreover, the fact that T is minimal implies that the budget frontier coincides with the lower envelope of upper contour sets for all i 2 N . For bundles such that y w (m), the budget frontier therefore coincides with the lower envelope of upper contour sets for all i 2 P . This implies that B + (T ) = B i (T ) for any i 2 P -otherwise there would be a gap between the budget frontier and the lower envelope of upper contour sets. Therefore the intersection of the upper frontier of B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)) with the upper frontier of B + (T ) belongs to the upper contour set of some i 2 P , which implies that for this particular i, IT (z i ; R i ) = t 0 . By Proposition 1, necessarily
The fact that, due to (1), both the Preference Diversity assumption and the minimality assumption are rather special in our framework restricts the scope of Corollary 3, in contrast with the Mirrlees model in which they are unexceptional. In the framework of this paper, it is harder to spot the worst o¤ agents at arbitrary tax policies.
More on the bounds
Let us examine in more details the bounds obtained in Proposition 1, starting with the lower bound t 0 . Its computation in (c; l; h) space is not transparently connected with the tax function T . It is instructive to examine how t 0 can be computed when one looks at the budget set in the In order to seek the intersection between B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)) and B + (T ) in (c; y; m) space, the former budget has to be rescaled so that the con…guration of the two budgets correctly represents 1 2 Notice that this is not generally the same as 
The value of t 0 corresponds to the minimum of this expression, i.e., the lowest value of t 0 such that the upper boundaries of the two budget sets have a non-empty intersection. and B + (T ), then t 0 is the minimum of
Otherwise, the minimum of (3) is less or equal to t 0 , and therefore still provides a lower bound for
Proof. The …rst part has been proved in the text. 
where T x denotes the partial derivative of T with respect to x (assuming that these functions are di¤erentiable), or
for m such that w (m ) m T (w (m ) ; m ) = 0.
Let us interpret these results, in light of the fact that the intersection of the two budget sets identi…es the worst o¤ agent if there is i 2 P whose upper contour set contains this point. The left hand side of equation (5) features the impact of an increase in m on consumption for an agent from P . On the right-hand side, it displays the impact on consumption, of the same increase in human capital, for an agent with average characteristics at laissez-faire. Hence, the worst o¤ agent, if his bundle lies at the intersection, belongs to P , works full time and enjoys a post-tax productivity of human capital expenditures equal to the pre-tax productivity of an average type agent with the same amount of labor and human capital (note that the same level of h would be obtained by the average type agent for a di¤erent level of m). The second case, equation (6), is obtained when the intersection of the two budget sets occurs at a bundle where consumption is null (a corner solution). This corresponds to a case in which the worst o¤ situation corresponds to the greatest a¤ordable human capital expenditure (and full-time work) for a worst-type agent.
Let us now turn our attention to the upper bound that appears in Proposition 1. This term is informationally demanding because it requires the computation of the situation of all types of agents induced by T . In order to reduce the computational requirements of the upper bound, one can invoke Preference Diversity and then look only at all i such that y i w (m i ). Thus, knowing the distribution of earnings and human capital expenditures in this low-income bracket is enough, and no information about which type consumes which bundle is needed.
However, as we have already explained, this assumption is restrictive because it imposes restrictions on preferences. An alternative is to look at all i such that y i w (m i ) and
(m i ). For this to yield an upper bound, one only needs to assume that all points (c i ; y i ; m i ) such that (y i ; m i ) satisfy these conditions could be chosen by some agents from P (they can also be chosen by some other agent). This is formulated in the following assumption. Note that by incentive compatibility, necessarily (c j ; y j ; m j ) R j (c i ; y i ; m i ), so that we could as well write (c i ; y i ; m i ) I j (c j ; y j ; m j ) in the assumption . Assumption 3 is a logically weaker variant of the Preference Diversity assumption. Indeed it only assumes that, for the particular tax function T , and the particular allocation it generates, the undominated part of the budget set of agents in P contains no bundle that is chosen by some agent with better circumstances and would not be acceptable to any of the agents in P . This is weaker than Preference Diversity in two ways.
First, it depends on the speci…c tax function T , and it may not hold for some other tax function, whereas Preference Diversity is independent of T . Second, unlike Preference Diversity, it imposes no restriction on the N n P agents'preferences. In a nutshell, our new assumption is much weaker, and obtains results for more economies, but it does not apply to all tax functions.
Proposition 5 Let z be an incentive-compatible allocation generated by the tax function T . Under Preference Diversity,
Under Weak Preference Diversity,
Proof. First, observe that, for the P subpopulation de…ned in the Worst Type assumption,
is an upper bound for min i IT (z i ; R i ). We focus on the speci…cation of this upper bound.
Under Preference Diversity, the intersection of the closed lower contour sets of all i 2 N; on the subset of (c; y; m) such that y w (m), coincides with the intersection of the closed lower contour sets of all i 2 P . Therefore, for all chosen bundles (c i ; y i ; m i ) such that y i w (m i ), there is j 2 P such that (c i ; y i ; m i ) I j (c j ; y j ; m j ). For such j, one has
The conclusion follows.
Under Weak Preference Diversity, the same reasoning as in the previous paragraph holds on the subset of chosen (c i ; y i ; m i ) such that y i w (m i ) and b y i
This corollary is important because it reduces the amount of information needed for policy evaluation to data that are more easily available to the policy-maker than the full distribution of population characteristics. It su¢ ces to look at bundles in a well-de…ned area -the function w is known-and, regarding the second part of the result, it is not di¢ cult to locate and exclude the dominated part of the worst-type budget.
Apart from Corollary 3, in our results there is no guarantee that the worst o¤ individuals actually belong to the worst type. But this is plausible and it would not be di¢ cult to make assumptions to this e¤ect (e.g., assuming that all types of preference orderings R i found in the population are represented in P ). However, this would not provide any di¤erent bounds than those obtained here, it would only probably make them closer to min i IT (z i ; R i ). Nonetheless, the introduction of the Worst Type assumption considerably sharpens the scope of Proposition 1 as re ‡ected by Propositions 4 and 5 whose practical implications are quite simple to grasp: even if the well being of the worst o¤ agent cannot necessarily be measured and she is not necessarily a member of P, still she is located in the region of the budget set that is attainable by a poor agent.
This part of the budget set should be the focus of any reform.
We consider the previous section to be the most relevant for practical policy-making. However, the classical literature on optimal taxation has by and large focused on the design of the optimal tax scheme (that is, a tax scheme that maximizes the social welfare function under incentive compatibility constraints). In this section and the next one, we study some properties of the optimal tax scheme under the particular notion of social welfare we are using.
We …rst restrict our attention to linear taxes. Namely,
where 2 R is a universal lump-sum grant while 2 R and 2 R are the parameters for marginal income tax rate and human capital subsidy rate. This implies that, for each agent i 2 N , the budget set modi…ed by the tax function is
or, in (c; l; h) space,
Each agent i chooses a bundle (c i ; l i ; h i ) that is the best for her preferences in this budget.
This choice depends (apart from her preferences) on her circumstances and on the parameters , and . To sum up we can de…ne the functions 
Let ( ; ) denote the maximum compatible with a given pair ( ; ). Plugging ( ; ) into equation (7) one obtains a budget constraint that is function of two parameters only ( ; ). That is,
Or, equivalently
where
Di¤erentiating both sides of (8) by one obtains
Similarly, di¤erentiating both sides of (8) by one obtains
From these two equations, after some manipulations, one obtains
We will focus here on the ratio = , which is a good summary of the instrument mix:
We will assume that > 0 > . In order to better understand the determinants of the optimal ratio between redistribution (of income) and subsidization (of human capital), we will also have a close look to the case of quasi-linear preferences where Y = M = 0. This simpli…es (13) into
If there is a su¢ cient diversity of preferences, the optimal tax will be close to being the best . Assuming an interior solution, one then obtains, by the envelope theorem, that the evolution of u when tax parameters change is described by:
The optimal tax for i then satis…es:
Plugging this into equation (13), one gets:
and, in the case of quasi-linear preferences (equation (14)):
We will focus on the standard situation in which
and, moreover,
because if increases, M increases, makes agents more productive, so that they work more and earn even more; if increases, agents work less, which reduces the payo¤ of human capital, therefore leading to less expenditure in m.
Similarly, if income e¤ects are not too strong, we can then assume that
If m i > M=n and y i < Y =n, then and have the same sign, which will be positive if
This determines the sign of the denominator in (11) and (12). a plausible condition. In particular, in the quasi-linear case, this condition boils down to M Y > M Y , which is very likely to occur because Y should be more sensitive to than to , whereas the opposite holds for M .
So, under the assumptions we have listed so far what does ultimately determine the mix of income redistribution and human capital subsidies? If M is much greater than jM j and jY j is much greater than Y , and if M ; jY j are small, the prominent terms in (15) and (16) form the
and provide a simple message. More redistribution than subsidizing will take place if human capital expenditures react strongly to subsidies whereas earnings react less to tax (this re ‡ects the incentive concern), and if the gap between the relevant worst-o¤ agent and the average situation is greater in earnings and smaller in human capital expenditures (this re ‡ects the inequality concern). This simple message is re…ned by adding the other components of the ratios in (15) and (16).
In particular, more income redistribution in the mix will be pushed by a greater sensitivity of M to income tax and a lower sensitivity of Y to human capital subsidies. These results also suggest that it may be optimal to tax human capital expenditures if the worst-o¤ spend less than average in human capital or, alternatively, earn more than average. The former case does not appear wage, high cost of human capital) human capital expenditure is .09 units below the average. The particular feature of this example is that the worst-o¤ agents have preferences with less concern for leisure but also for human capital than the other type of preferences.
It must be emphasized, however, that even in this kind of economy, lower-than-average human capital expenditures on behalf of the worst-o¤ is not su¢ cient to induce an optimal tax (i.e., a negative subsidy) on such expenditures, because the other terms in (16) Note that, except in the simulations, little use has been made in this analysis of the speci…c social ordering introduced earlier in the paper. The only feature of this ordering that has been invoked is its focus on the worst-o¤ (independently of how the worst-o¤ is identi…ed). Thus, in light of the previous section, it is worth exploring how the results are further speci…ed when the relevant worst-o¤ agent i is from P and when it is a good approximation to consider IT i ( ; ; ) = t 0 and i is working (approximately) 14 full time, so that y i = w (m i ). Then, the comparison between y i and average earnings may depend on the pro…le of the population, but it should remain quite standard to have y i < Y =n.
In addition, if c i > 0, then, from equation (5), m i = m (h i ), for h i such that:
This also reads
If w 0 (h i ) is much lower than w 0 (h i ), and if m 0 (h i ) is signi…cantly greater than m 0 (h i ), this equation
requires a high . This shows that the optimal policy then does not only depend on the earnings and expenditure gap between the worst-o¤ and the average, but also on the gap in terms of marginal bene…t and marginal cost of human capital.
Optimal tax: the non-linear case
Describing the optimal non-linear tax policy is extremely hard when the individuals di¤er in many dimensions and their behavior unfolds in a three-dimensional space. We will focus on a very speci…c aspect of the optimal tax, which is limited but nevertheless quite central in understanding the shape of the optimal policy. Our goal is to determine what sort of agent (type, behavior) will receive the greatest subsidy at the second-best optimum. Let z be an optimal incentive-compatible allocation. In the following proposition, t 0 is de…ned as in Section 5.2. This proposition identi…es a way to cut subsidies above a certain level without harming the role of t 0 as a lower bound for well-being as measured by IT . The right-hand side is increasing in l, so one must have
In addition, as (c; l; h) 2 B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)),
One therefore obtains a contradiction with the de…nition of r :
The previous proposition proves that constructing T from T does not necessarily entail a large welfare loss in the sense that t 0 remains a lower bound for the worst o¤ at the allocation generated by both tax functions. The following corollary identi…es the conditions under which the two tax functions are welfare equivalent, namely, the conditions under which T is actually optimal.
Corollary 7 Under the conditions of Proposition 6, if
Proof. This derives from the fact that by construction, IT i (z i ; R i ) IT i (z i ; R i ) for all i, and by Proposition 6, t 0 min i IT i (z i ; R i ). In the proof of Proposition 6 it was shown that if T cannot implement z (because z i is no longer a¤ordable for some i), then z generates a surplus.
But if this is the case, it is possible to distribute the surplus so as to raise IT i for every i. 15 This would contradict the fact that z is optimal and therefore maximizes min i IT i (z i ; R i ).
These results suggest that it is interesting to study T . Note that even if t 0 <
so that if t 0 is close to min i IT i (z i ; R i ), the allocation z is close to being optimal. Therefore, when looking at the optimal tax scheme, there is no loss, or a limited loss, of social welfare if one restricts his attention to taxes that share the salient features of T . In what follows we describe some of these features.
What is interesting about T is that it generates a budget c = y m T (y; m) which lies between the hyperplane c = y m + t 0 + r and the manifold de…ned by y w (m) and c = y w m 1 (m)
The former fact is a direct consequence of T (y; m) (t 0 + r ); the latter is nothing but the translation, in (c; y; m) space, of the fact that B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)) B + (T ). Indeed, in (c; l; h) space the equation de…ning B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)) is c = w (h) l m (l) + t 0 . Substituting l = y=w (h) 1 and h = m 1 (m) yields the manifold described by (17) .
The intersection between the hyperplane and the manifold determines the sort of individual who receives the greatest subsidy. The intersection is determined by the equation
but, more simply, corresponds to the point which de…nes r , i.e., the maximum of w(h) w (h)
This means in particular that l = 1 at this point, i.e., the greatest subsidy goes to full-time work. It remains to determine the value of h or m at the maximum.
The maximum can be obtained either at a point h satisfying
or at a point such that t 0 + w(h) m(h) = 0: The latter case will be obtained in particular if
In such a case the greatest subsidy is obtained by a P agent who works full time and has a null consumption because of great human capital expenditures.
The P agents who work full time and have lower human capital than h , i.e., lower expenditures than m (h ), face a non-negative marginal rate of subsidy for human capital expenditures (on average over this part of their budget), whereas those who have greater expenditures face a nonpositive rate of subsidy on average. This is due to the fact that their budget set under T has to lie below the hyperplane at which the rate of subsidy is null.
Similarly, the agents (from P or not from P ) who spend m (h ) and earn less than w (h ) face on average over this range of earnings a non-positive marginal tax rate. But note that when t 0 + w(h ) m(h ) = 0 there are no such agents because consumption is below zero in this area.
Let us brie ‡y compare our results to those of Fleurbaey and Maniquet [16] for the Mirrlees model (with exogenous human capital). They obtained the general conclusion that at an optimal allocation for a similar social ordering (egalitarian-equivalent with reference wage equal to the average) it was possible to have a tax function with a marginal rate that is non-positive on average over income below the lowest wage, with a greatest subsidy granted to the least skilled individuals working full time. They relied on a preference diversity assumption.
Here we have avoided this assumption because it is restrictive in our setting, and nevertheless obtained a similar focus on the hardworking poor. It is technically interesting to understand what can be said in absence of this assumption. But there are two more important di¤erences. First, the focus is no longer on the least skilled agents but on the agents with the least favorable dispositions.
Agents with the lowest skills but better dispositions than the worst type are not considered among the worst-o¤ here. Second, for the same reason, the advantage given to hardworking agents is now restricted to those who have important human capital expenditures. The healthy who have low skills may face substantial tax rates on earnings if this helps funding the human capital subsidy.
Of course, this more complex con…guration comes in part from the fact that we studied the most general tax function T (y; m) with any possible interdependence between the tax on y and the subsidy on m. The study of the special but interesting case of separate non-linear instruments T (y) ; S (m) is not undertaken in this paper.
Observable human capital
We will turn now our attention to a di¤erent informational context. Let us assume that h is observed, together with c; y; m. This amounts to saying that, for instance, when it comes to education, the policy maker can observe the diplomas an agent has. Alternatively one could think of health. In this case our assumption implies that the social planner can rely on the physicians's evaluation in order to assess agents'health status. In such an informational framework the incentive-compatibility constraint becomes: for all i; j;
As in the previous setting, agent i still has to receive an allocation that she prefers to the allocation received by agent j unless it is not possible for her to mimic agent j. This occurs either if y j > w i (m i ) (exactly as in the previous framework) or if m i (h j ) 6 = m j (h j ). That is, agent i can pretend to have agent j's human capital disposition only if her human capital disposition function crosses j's function at h = h j . 16 To simplify the analysis and to better analyze the consequences of using an egalitarian social objective we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Nested Types) The m i functions do not cross, i.e., there is no i; j such that for some
This assumption allows us to partition the population into di¤erent subgroups of agents having the same human capital disposition. Let K denote the set of subgroups resulting from such a partition. The fact that the human capital level is observable entails that one can conceive a di¤erent tax policy T k (y; m) for each k 2 K.
We also introduce a further assumption which is meant to rule out a strict relation between having a good earning ability and a good human capital disposition. Whatever the human capital disposition, there is always some agent with the worst earning ability belonging to such group.
Correlation is however permitted.
Assumption 5 (Uniformity): For every k = 1; :::; K, there is i in subgroup k such that
This assumption just rules out the possibility for the policy maker of conceiving a tax scheme that is particularly harsh to some speci…c subgroup k just because she happens to know that no unskilled agents belong to that subgroup. Let P k denote the subset of i from subgroup k such that w i = w. Let also B + k (T ) denote the budget set of some agent belonging to P k , for
Consider the budget B(t 0 ; w(:); m(:)) of a hypothetical agent with average circumstances, 1 6 An alternative speci…cation would allow agents to "in ‡ate" their expenditures and pretend they have a worse m function than they really have. In this case the incentive-compatibility constraint would become:for all i; j;
This alternative setting would give some protection to agents with a better disposition. However the practical implications would not be very di¤erent since we rely on an egalitarian social welfare function anyway. Hence we stick to the setting presented in the main text which is simpler.
under laissez-faire except for a lump-sum transfer t k 2 R:
For any k 2 K and for t k small enough (possibly negative), this budget B(t k ; w(:); m(:)) is contained in B + k (T ). Let t k be the maximum level at which this property is satis…ed. This maximum level is well de…ned because both B + k (T ) and B(t k ; w(:); m(:)) are compact, and the latter varies continuously with t k .
We are now able to bracket the value of min i IT (z i ; R i ) ; as stated below. As far as optimal tax is concerned, the result of the previous section applies to every subgroup k separately. What is new is that an optimal tax will equalize min i2k IT (z i ; R i ) across k. This is not the same as equalizing t k across k, because in absence of preference diversity, one may have t k < min i2k IT (z i ; R i ) for some k.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a very general model in which earnings and human capital expenditures provide the basis for a redistribution policy that respects individual choices on labor and human capital, but seeks to eliminate inequalities due to inter-individual di¤erences in the intrinsic cost to acquire human capital and in earning ability conditional on human capital.
Our main intent is to contribute to the theory of tax reform (Feldstein [10] ). The idea is to see how certain ideas of fairness lead to the evaluation of arbitrary tax policies in such a general model. We …nd that the policy maker should primarily be interested in the part of the budget set that is attainable by agents endowed with the worst personal circumstances. Interestingly, the worst o¤ agent, at any arbitrary incentive compatible allocation, need not be one of such agents.
In typical circumstances (in particular, when the marginal tax rate on income is less than 100 percent), the part of the budget set that should be the focus of attention corresponds to the full time earnings of an agent from the worst type, at a level of human capital expenditures de…ned in terms of post-tax productivity of human capital expenditures.
The paper also contributes to the theory of optimal taxation. We look both at linear and non linear tax schemes. The main di¤erence between the two cases is that in the former one human capital expenditure might actually be taxed while in the latter case human capital expenditures are subsidized on the margin, up to a level of expenditures de…ned in reference to the agents who receive the greatest absolute amount of subsidy.
Several extensions of this analysis can be considered. First, our analysis has ignored risk in the production of human capital and in the returns to human capital on the labor market. However, we believe that our analysis covers the most relevant case of pure idiosyncratic risk, i.e., when the policy-maker is able to predict the distribution of individual situations. It is then more respectful of the individuals'preferences to take account of this distribution rather than just the individual ex ante prospects, because what the individuals care about is their …nal situation.
Another extension would consider more than one dimension of human capital. While our model can be applied to education or health, it cannot be applied to both dimensions simultaneously, unless they are lumped together into a single human capital variable. The extension of the social ordering function to multidimensional human capital is straightforward, but the application to tax evaluation is less obvious because two kinds of expenditures can then be distinguished by the tax function.
A key feature of our approach, which helps a lot in obtaining results in such a general model, is the absolute priority granted to the worst-o¤. One may …nd that indexing well-being by moneymetric utilities IT i (z i ; R i ) is sensible but resist the absolute priority. It would be interesting to see what happens to the results when a strong but …nite degree of priority replaces the maximin criterion in the evaluation of taxes. This would imply paying attention to levels of income above the levels accessible to the worst type.
Finally, actual policies are segmented and speci…c tax-subsidy functions operate separately on income and human capital expenditures. Our analysis of reform evaluation, fortunately, carries over to this case which is a subclass of the arbitrary tax functions studied here. The analysis of optimal linear tax, by construction, happens to satisfy this separation property. But such is not the case for optimal non-linear taxation. The methodology of Proposition 6 cannot be applied because for an optimal tax function T that is additively separable in earnings and human capital expenditures, the new tax function T that cuts all subsidies above a …xed level loses this property.
We list here the axioms that characterize the social welfare function used in the paper. For a description of the normative implications of the axioms and for a formal proof of the characterization one can see Valletta [36] ). 
